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Privacy and Information Technology
I. Introduction
In both law and ethics, "privacy" is an
umbrella term for a wide variety of interests.
Much of the vast literature on privacy has focused
on an interest protected in American tort law
referred to as the crucial core of privacy, and often
described as "having control over information
about oneself." Beginning in 1965, the United
States Supreme Court also recognized an
apparently distinct constitutional right to privacy.
Because there is no right to privacy explicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution, however, and the
constitutional cases invoking this right are so
diverse, there has been a great deal of criticism and
controversy surrounding the constitutional right of
privacy. Despite this confusion, reaction to recent
Supreme Court confirmation hearings has made it
clear that many in the American public and
congress are unwilling to give up the privacy
protection they currently enjoy.
I first discuss philosophical origins of
privacy, and the historical divergence between
privacy protection in tort and constitutional law.
Second, I describe areas of technological advance
in which informational privacy concerns - both
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moral and legal - are raised. For each I suggest
some responses and possible solutions. I then
explain my general approach to privacy concerns
arising from technological advance. My view is
that new technologies must be managed
appropriately, to safeguard privacy vigorously and
comprehensively, without sacrificing their
technological benefits.
Let me make two preliminary points. First,
I shall not place special weight on privacy as a
right, as opposed to a claim or an interest. A
claim is often described as an argument that
someone deserves something. A right is then a
justified claim; justified by laws or judicial
decisions if it is a legal right, by moral principles if
it is a moral right.1 My points are significant,
however, independently of whether or not we can
ultimately make sense of rights, explain when they
are binding, or show that they are reducible to
utilitarian claims. The literature on privacy uses
rights terminology, and I accommodate that. Yet
I begin by referring to privacy more generally as an
interest, by which I mean something it would be a
good thing to have, leaving open how extensively
it ought to be protected.
Second and more obviously, nothing in my
discussion requires assuming one endorse all the
decisions in cases I cite. One can appreciate the
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controversy however one views the actual
judgments.
II. Philosophical and Other Origins of Privacy
Some concept (or multiple concepts) of
privacy has played a fundamental role in political
and religious writings as well as in biological,
anthropological, and sociological studies from
antiquity to today. There is ample evidence for
this, some of which is explicit in written material
and some of which derives from customs and
social practices.
Consider first two examples from political
philosophy. An important and well-known
(though sometimes controversial) tenet since t~le
time of Aristotle has been the dichotomy between
public and private realms. In his book on politics,
Aristotle saw the polis, the concept of a structured
body politic and province of political activity, as a
public sphere where details of government and the
proceedings of the city-state developed.2 Political
animals by nature, men (but not women or slaves
or children) were intended to participate fully in
the polis. In ancient times as well as later, the
trend was to set limits on the power of
governmental authority by separating from this
public sphere various places and activities viewed
as illegitimate arenas for public regulation. For
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Aristotle, the oikos was a private sphere attached
to the home, namely the private household.
Family life served as a paradigm of the private
sphere that defined the role of women.
A second instance in political literature
comes from John Locke, who marked off the
distinction between public and private property in
his Second Treatise on Government (1690). The
original state of nature, according to Locke, is for
all "a state of perfect freedom to order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the
Law of Nature."3 In the state of nature no person
has exclusive rights to the earth. The earth and all
the bounty produced by nature belong to all in
common. Nevertheless, each person possesses
himself (or herselt) absolutely and has property
rights to that with which he mixes his labor.
Everyone has a property right to "his own person"
and can extend it through sweat and labor. Thus
what belongs to and is acquired by the self is
private property and is distinctly separate from
what is owned publicly or in common with all. In
Locke's Treatise there are other contexts in which
the separation between public and private remains,
yet the relationship between the two spheres is
more complex. Those who freely consent to
create a political society thereby establish public
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means, namely the maintenance of civic order
through social contract, to assure private ends,
specifically the protection of life, liberty, and
property. In contrast to Aristotle's view, the state
becomes for Locke a necessary means for public
protection of certain private ends.
Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain
has argued that a wide array of thinkers "of the
Western political tradition assumed and deployed
some form of a distinction between the public and
the private ....As conceptual categories, public and
private ordered and structured diverse activities,
purposes, and dimensions of human social life and
thinking about that life. ,,4 The public/private split
has sometimes been taken to reflect differences
between the appropriate scope of government, as
opposed to self-regulation by individuals. It has
also been interpreted to differentiate political and
domestic spheres of life. These diverse linguistic
descriptions capture overlapping yet nonequivalent
concepts. Nevertheless they share the assumption
that there is a boundary marking off that which is
private from that which is public.
In addition to these philosophical
references to a distinction between public and
private, consider as well biological and
anthropological studies that provide evidence of
the fundamental value placed on privacy.
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Philosopher Alan Westin, has reviewed animal
studies demonstrating that a desire for privacy is
not distinctively human.s Such studies show, for
example, that virtually all animals seek periods of
individual seclusion or small-group intimacy.
Usually described as a tendency toward
territoriality, such patterns serve various biological
purposes, especially that of ensuring propagation
of the species. Westin concludes that lithe
parallels between territory rules in animals and
trespass concepts in human society are obvious: in
each, the organism lays claim to private space to
promote individual well-being and small-group
intimacy."6
Anthropological studies by Margaret Mead
and others, as well as social and psychological
research, support this view that privacy is a cross-
cultural and cross-species universal. 7 They have
shown that virtually all societies have techniques
for setting distances and avoiding contact with
others in order to establish physical boundaries to
maintain privacy. Although some primitive
cultures appear to show no concern for privacy for
changing clothes, bathing, birth, death, and so on,
anthropologists have found that these cultures use
various psychological methods for gaining privacy
for the individual or family when communal life
makes such physical privacy protection impossible.
-6-
Withholding feelings and expression, averting
one's eyes, facing a wall, for instance, provide
more subtle ways of putting up social barriers.s
This brief survey demonstrates that despite
the emphasis placed on privacy in varied contexts,
the idea of privacy employed is not always the
same. Privacy may refer to the separation of
spheres of activity, limits on governmental
authority, forbidden knowledge and experience,
limited access, and ideas of group membership, to
name a few possibilities. Consequently, this
background sketch provides evidence that privacy
is commonly taken to incorporate different clusters
of interests.
Anthropological literature documents the
increased physical and psychological opportunities
in modern societies to gain privacy through more
anonymity, mobility, and economic autonomy. At
the same time, however, greater population
density, technological advances, and increased
governmental power all undermine an individual's
ability to maintain a private space within a broader
social community.
III. Legal History of Two Privacy Interests
It is likely that technological advance was
a major impetus for the codification of privacy
protection in written law in the United States.
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American law has evolved to protect two
apparently different rights to privacy--one
developed in the last ninety years in tort and
Fourth Amendment law, the other first announced
as a constitutional right in 1965. Taken within the
context of the influence of common law, both are
relatively recent developments in u.s. law.
One of the most influential law review
articles ever written was "The Right to Privacy" by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. Arguing that
"political, social, and economic changes entail
recognition of new rights" and "the common
law ...grows to meet the demands of society,"9
Warren and Brandeis urged that protection we
already had against actual bodily injury (battery),
attempts (assault), nuisances (offensive noises and
odors), slander, and even alienation of a wife's
affections (which was held remediable!)lO should
be supplemented with a right to privacy protecting
a person even if the injury is merely to individual
feelings. Relying on Judge Cooley's phrase, the
right "to be let alone,"ll and cases they felt were
already precedents, they argued that the law
should "protect the privacy of private life"12by
securing for an individual the right of determining
the extent to which his or her written work,
thoughts, sentiments, or likeness could be given to
the public. Citing recent inventions and numerous
-8-
mechanical devices such as high-speed cameras
and presses for mass production of newspapers
that "have invaded the sacred precincts of private
and domestic life,"13they urged the law to offer a
remedy for protection from such invasions.
One story holds that Warren was upset
about newspaper publicity concerning his
daughter's wedding. That has been disputed. If
correct, however, it makes clear the early link
between technological advance, namely the rise of
large-scale media coverage through newspapers,
and growing worries about protecting individual
privacy.
Up until 1890 when Warren and Brandeis'
paper appeared, American law had been extremely
cautious about protecting emotional harms for at
least two reasons: (i) the difficulty of assessing
damages for emotional harms and (ii) the
subjectivity of the findings based on a state of
mind, especially where there is no parallel or
concomitant physical injury. While the second is
perhaps a reasonable concern, the first is a poor
excuse for denying recovery. Surely it is no less
difficult to fix a dollar value on a finger lost, an
arm, or a life. But Warren and Brandeis were
arguing that existing law already recognized a
principle of privacy derived from common law in
such cases as breach of trust and defamation,
-9-
which, when applied to new facts, could protect
individuals from the press, photographers, or
anyone with devices for recording or reproducing
sounds or scenes. Thus they claimed not to be
advocating judicial activism, that is, judicial
legislation or the addition of legal principles by
judges. 14
While the earliest test cases failed to
protect the right Warren and Brandeis argued
for,15 both the American public and subsequent
cases16soon endorsed and expanded it in tort and
Fourth Amendment cases. What I am referring to
as "tort privacy" now covers interests individuals
have in protection from unwarranted observations
of themselves and their activities, materials, and
conversations, whether these occur in person or
through electronic surveillance. Owing to the
growth of computer technology and capacities for
rapid recording and retrieval of vast amounts of
data, protection has also been increased against
having one's communications reproduced or
misused without authorization, and against having
information about oneself appropriated and
exploited. Such abuse of information includes
attacks on one's reputation, disclosure of
embarrassing facts, and use of one's name or
likeness without permission.1? Alternatively, the
protected data may be relevant to the Privacy Act
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of 1974 which covers employment, academic, and
medical records.
The second legal right to privacy protected
in the United States is even more difficult to
describe. It was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in 1965 when it overturned convictions for
violating Connecticut statutes which banned
disbursement of contraceptive-related information,
instruction, and medical advice to married
persons.18 Controversy began almost immediately
because there were four opinions written in
defense of the judgment, each offering a different
justification. In a subsequent case, Justice
Brennan argued,
... if the constitutional right to privacy
means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.19
This paved the way for using the constitutional
right to privacy as a defense for the famous and
controversial Roe v. Wade20 abortion decision the
following year. Then in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland privacy was extended to decisions
concerning family composition and living
arrangements.21 Furthermore, constitutional
privacy was cited as one major reason for
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overturning mandatory sterilization laws,22and for
allowing "possession of obscene matter" in one's
home,23 interracial marriage,24 and attendance at
public schools.25
Many commentators have defined the tort
interest in privacy as "control over information
about oneself," and that interest is referred to as
the classic notion of privacy. Given this intuitive
characterization of tort and Fourth Amendment
privacy concerns, it is possible to see a conceptual
difference between privacy interests protected in
tort and Fourth Amendment law and in
constitutional privacy. Paradigmatically, tort
privacy cases involve concerns with information--
either conveyed by an individual (e.g. in private
conversation or activity) or about an individual
(e.g. records, newspaper stories). We should take
care to note, however, that tort privacy is not as
univocal as this description indicates. In tort and
Fourth Amendment law, intrusive behavior such as
snooping or spying can violate privacy even if no
information is gathered or disseminated. It now
protects one as well from harassment from bill
collectors and stomach pumping for evidence.26
The constitutional privacy cases are even more
diverse, ranging over issues related to one's body,
family relations, life style, and child rearing.
In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court made
-12-
its most comprehensive effort thus far to define the
legal right to privacy, embracing both (i) an
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters" and (ii) an "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions. ,,27 The Whalen case was deemed to
involve both aspects of privacy. Nevertheless, the
Court upheld New York statutes for maintaining
computerized records of prescriptions for certain
dangerous but lawful drugs (morphine used by
cancer patients, for example) even though the
records included the patients' names and
addresses. Here was a data base of sensitive
information, where access was not controlled.
Although Whalen was said to involve both privacy
interests, what I have been calling the tort interest
in privacy (which still arises, of course, in Supreme
Court cases) and the constitutional right to privacy
(now often cited in lower court decisions) are still
often viewed as separable interests.
One theme of my book, In Pursuit of
Privacy: Law, Ethics and the Rise of Technology,
focuses on constitutional privacy and the
philosophically interesting claim that the line of
constitutional cases since Griswold involve rights
which have "no basis in any meaningful conception
of privacy."28 I argue that there is a similarity of
reasons for protection of privacy in varied cases,
-13-
showing that the close relationship between tort
and Fourth Amendment and constitutional privacy
claims is philosophically well-motivated,
historically accurate, and reflected in ordinary
language--all considerations that justify a broad
conception of privacy, which I characterize as a
multi-faceted cluster concept. Another theme in
my book focuses on ways advancing technology
threatens tort or informational privacy. I examine
privacy issues raised by (i) database information
storage and (ii) new telephone and computer
services such as caller identification and e-mail.
IV. Database and On-line Information
Consider first a case involving credit
bureaus and the U.S. Post Office.29 We now pay
32 cents in the United States for a first-class
postage stamp, more than double its price in 1960,
even when adjusted for inflation. But those who
are frustrated about paying more money for
stamps may be even more concerned that this is
not the only step the U. S. Postal Service has
considered taking to increase profits. The postal
service has also studied plans to sell addresses, as
part of the first nationwide electronic address list,
to direct-mail companies and other businesses.
Unfortunately, this profit-seeking move is
potentially very costly to consumers, as it risks
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major losses of individual privacy.
The problem does not lie solely with the
proposed address list. It is what businesses,
investigators and government can do by matching
such a list with names and other information
available for sale. The postal executives have
claimed the list will reduce undeliverable mail and
that they will strictly control use of the list. We
may well wonder why, then, the direct mail
industry has become so excited at the prospect.
In America, when you request a store
catalogue or file a change of address card or fill a
prescription, your name goes on a list. When you
apply for a mortgage, a driver's license, or
telephone service, you part with private details
about yourself and often supply extensive amounts
of information. Virtually every transaction today
is recorded in a computer, and a recent
consequence is the routine collection and transfer
of personal infonnation in digitized form. The sale
of such data for profit in the American private
sector is now a multimillion- dollar business
dominated by the leading credit bureaus: TRW in
California, Equifax in Atlanta and Trans Union
Credit Infonnation in Chicago. The sheer volume
of information stored and repeatedly resold is
stunning: these information sponges keep more
than 400 million records on 160 million
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individuals. [Consider this data: TRW 1988
revenues: $ 335,000,000, 155 million individual
files; Trans Union 1988 revenues: $300,000,000,
155 million files; Equifax 1988 revenues:
$269,000,000, 100 million files, and they are not
the only ones in the business.30]
At little or no cost, the bureaus make it
easy for almost anyone to find out another
individual's income, employment status, marital
status, driving record, real estate holdings, credit
limit, and even civil and criminal court records.
Yet it is difficult or impossible for individuals to
find out if information about them is being used.
A Business Week article described how
... the long arm of American Express Co.
reached out and grabbed Ray Parrish.
After getting his credit card in January, the
22-year old New Yorker promptly paid
bills of $331 and $204.39 in February and
March. Then he got a surprising call. His
credit privileges were being suspended, an
American Express clerk informed him,
because his checking account showed too
small a balance to pay his April charge of
$596. A contrite American Express now
says it should have asked before peeking,
and it reinstated Parrish after he paid his
bill from his savings and cash on hand.
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But that was beside the point. "I felt
violated," says Parrish, who has kept his
card because he needs it. "When I gave
them my bank account number, I never
thought they would use it to routinely look
over my shoulder. ,,31
TRW, Equifax, and Trans Union claim to guard
their information, but they actually sell it readily.
As a test, one of the editors of Business Week
signed up with two superbureaus,
identifying himself as an editor at
McGraw-Hill Inc. He told one fib: that he
might be hiring an employee or two and
would need their credit reports. After a
perfunctory check, both bureaus gave him
carte blanche--and revealed the surprising
breadth of their files....Provided with just
the names and addresses of two of his
colleagues, one superbureau produced
their credit reports--including their social
security numbers that the editor didn't
have--for $20 apiece. The superbureau
manager warned that one colleague's
mortgage was ominously large, then
offered to fax the reports.
The second arrangement was more
open-ended. For a $500 initial fee, the
editor got access via his home computer to
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the superbureau's data base. Free to
explore, he again checked on his
colleagues, at about $15 per report. Then
he ran two names whose prominence
might have set off alarms if the credit
agency audited use of its files. One was
Representative Richard J. Durbin (0-111.),
the other Dan Quayle [who was vice-
president at the time.]
There were no alarms ....There was
nothing juicy.32
The editor learned that Quayle charges more at
Sears, Roebuck than at Brooks Brothers and has
a big mortgage; he was also given all Quayle's
credit card numbers. When told of the search,
Quayle was not amused.
There are at least four sets of privacy
problems generated by these huge credit bureau
databases: (1) First, once one is in a database in
the United States, one loses access to and control
over the information. There are few legal
restrictions at present, and a great deal of money
can be made by selling data. Economic and
market factors make the information vulnerable to
exposure. What one may have thought was
private, such as shopping and spending habits or
medical problems, soon can become public. (E.g.
results of genetic testing.)
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(2) Second, there are many loopholes in
current legal protections. That is, there is a
serious lack of protection despite statutory
attempts to salvage privacy.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 is a case
in point. It sounds good. It gives individuals the
right to see and correct their credit reports and
limits the rights of others to look at them. But it
has five exceptions, including a big one: Anyone
with a "legitimate business need" can peek.
Legitimate isn't defined.
Then there's the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978. It forbids the government to rummage
through bank-account records without following
set procedures. But it excludes state agencies,
including law enforcement officials, as well as
private employers. And more exceptions are
tacked on every year. 33
These loopholes minimize the effectiveness of the
legislation. Moreover, the patchwork of legal
protections is peculiar and difficult to justify.
Rental records from a video store are protected,
for example, while medical insurance records,
which often contain more important and more
personal information, are not. This is especially
disturbing since Blue Cross/Blue Shield and other
health care providers now require detailed
explanations of treatment before granting even
-19-
partial reimbursement, thus creating new medical
data files for each payment.
(3) Third, private individuals can now use
personal computers and Internet services to gain
access to database information. New software
developed by TRW, Lotus Development
Corporation and others, magnifies access to this
information because of its low cost, ease of use,
and lack of safeguards. What is more, these
computer programs allow unlimited use of the
information purchased. Similar information is now
available on-line, through privately held CDB
Infotek in Santa Ana, California, and Information
America in Atlanta. Both can be called on voice
lines, and searches conducted through these
companies can yield information such as divorce
records; mortgage, IRS, and other financial data;
and even individual social security numbers.34 It is
unnerving to learn that a public agency such as the
U.S. Postal Service would consider profiting from
such efforts, by providing a national address
directory with no "unlisted" option. One can, of
course, ask that one's name be removed from
mailing lists. One can decline to provide
information on certain forms. But there is no
guarantee that one's name will be removed.
Moreover, being added to a database is
unavoidable when one applies for credit cards,
-20-
gets a telephone or enters a hospital, and one
cannot dictate where and to whom the information
goes.
To be fair, it is important to note that
Lotus and Equifax have withdrawn some of their
prospective programs from the market--namely,
"Lotus Marketplace: Households," and "Lotus
Marketplace: Businesses," which anyone could tap
into with a personal computer. These programs
gave personal information on names broken down
by categories that included gender, age, marital
status, dwelling unit type, and shopping habits, on
about 120 million households. After a storm of
protest from 30,000 consumers, the products were
recalled. Equifax has also said it is giving up its
controversial practice of selling target lists drawn
from confidential credit files to purveyors of junk
mail.35
These are clearly major concessions to the
growing public sentiment that electronic databases
and on-line services providing access to sensitive
information are used inways that threaten personal
privacy. Yet other data bureaus and Internet data
services insist they have no plans to reduce access
to their information banks. And the store of data
continues to increase. Information from the U.S.
census taken in 1990 was considerably more
detailed than in the past. The most recent census
-21-
data on house values, family membership,
ethnicity, elderly needs, transportation habits, and
educational level are now available on CD-ROM
and floppy disk, providing information easily and
inexpensively to direct marketers and others who
can access and convert into more usable formats.
(4) Fourth, data once recorded rarely
disappears. Yet obsolete information can be
misleading or incriminating out of context.
Moreover, in any database, the infonnation may be
erroneous. Surveys in 1988 and 1991 found errors
in 43 - 48 percent of credit reports, including as
many as 19 percent with inaccuracies that could
lead to denial of credit. 36 Errors may not be the
fault of the credit bureaus. Sometimes an original
public record is itself inaccurate. Regardless of an
error's source, however, there are no clear or
established procedures for correcting it. Simply
finding out if the information given out about
oneselfis inaccurate may not be difficult. In 1996,
TRW provided one free copy per year of any
individual's own credit file on request, and Equifax
and Trans Union charged a fee of only $8.00 for
each report.3? Despite easy access to files,
however, many people have horror stories about
what happens after they discover an error.
Correcting an error may be nearly impossible. One
-22-
man reportedly contacted a credit bureau
repeatedly to correct erroneous information. Soon
after, he was denied credit for a loan on the
grounds that computer records of his frequent
inquiries concerning his credit rating indicated he
may well have been "tampering" with the
information, and thus his high credit rating was
viewed as unreliable!
v. Caller Identification
My second illustration of developing
technology clashing with privacy is caller
identification.38 For several years, telephone
companies have been offering a service to
businesses with "800" or "900" telephone numbers
that routinely provides marketers with end-of-the-
month lists of the phone numbers of all their
callers, with no restrictions on the use of the
information. Those lists are often sold to others
seeking to target new customers. The service is
rapidly expanding: thanks to technology now being
developed, all callers can be identified by their
phone numbers to whomever they call, even if
their numbers are unlisted in a telephone directory.
It is simple: for as little as $6.50 a month as a
service fee, plus a one-time equipment charge of
$29 - $80, customers can install on their phone an
electronic screen that flashes every incoming
-23-
number while the phone is still ringing. Telephone
companies can also deliver the name, as well as the
number, of the incoming caller, and that is quickly
becoming the service norm. Caller ID was first
introduced in the United States in New Jersey in
1987. By 1991 it was approved in over 20 states
and under consideration in 13 others.39
Some legal theorists have argued that the
caller ID technology does not raise significant
privacy concems.40 Justice Stewart's comments in
his dissent in Smith v. Maryland (1979) express
the contrary opinion:
It simply is not enough to say, after Katz,
that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed because the
caller assumes the risk that the telephone
company will disclose them ...Most private
telephone subscribers may have their own
numbers listed in a publicly distributed
directory, but I doubt that there are any
who would be happy to have broadcast to
the world a list of the local or long
distance numbers they have called. This is
not because such a list might in some sense
be incriminating, but because it easily
could reveal the identities of the persons
and the places called, and thus reveal the
most intimate details of a person's life.41
-24-
Privacy issues surrounding caller ID are
magnified because the telephone companies
offering the service are, in an almost Orwellian
fashion, becoming increasingly powerful keepers
and purveyors of information most of us consider
private. Recent court decisions have cleared the
way for the Baby Bells to enter the electronic
information services business, using phone lines to
provide news reports and stock quotes, as well as
long-term storage of business and medical
records.42 Now they have the power to package
and publish electronic information for sale across
business and home phone lines in ways we cannot
control, to everyone from prospective employers
to telemarketers, making the phone companies
ever more powerful as the scope of
telecommunications grows.
Protecting individual privacy without
losing the benefits of caller ID is a difficult
challenge. On one hand, proponents of the
technology argue it provides a valuable service to
people pestered by obscene or harassing phone
calls or persistent telemarketers, as well as to
delivery services such as florists who need
verification for orders or who are plagued by
pranksters. The benefits are obvious: caller ID lets
them know who is calling before they answer the
phone. On the other hand, privacy advocates for
-25-
callers vehemently disagree, maintaining that
callers have privacy rights, too, and should be able
to choose anonymity. They worry that the
prospect of identification will deter anonymous
police informants or callers to hot lines for drug
abusers, people with AIDS, or runaways, for
instance. They believe Caller ID can threaten the
safety of those trying to find refuge from batterers
or child abusers and will discourage doctors and
other professionals from returning emergency calls
from their homes, fearing release of their private
numbers.
Opponents of caller ID believe few of us
want our names and numbers automatically
available for direct callbacks, and they know
information about who calls a number can easily
be used to compile and update telemarketing lists
and data banks. They recognize that the cost of
caller ID puts it beyond the reach of low-income
customers, further aggravating inequalities of
power. As Pennsylvania ACLU Executive
Director Barry Steinhardt has argued, "Not only
does the use of Caller ID go against public policy,
but it is one more blatant example of how
emerging technology is stripping away individual
privacy rights layer by layer."43 Generally, when
people see themselves as receivers of phone calls,
they are eager for caller ID. But as callers, most
-26-
want the power to block display of their numbers
and names. Ironically, the privacy interests
compete within the same people: those who both
make and receive telephone calls.
The privacy problems of caller ID are
amplified in part by a similar telephone service
called ANI (automatic number identification)
geared to businesses, including those with toll-free
numbers. Like caller ID, ANI passes a telephone
number along with each call, and then matches the
number with a customer's corporate database in a
personal computer, making it possible for a caller's
file to be displayed before anyone answers the
phone.44 Beginning with just a phone number, a
whole host of information becomes common
property.
Most caller ID systems automatically
release the caller's phone number and name. To
prevent this information from being divulged for a
particular call, the caller must enter a code
(typically *67) before dialing the number. In other
words, callers must take an extra step each time
they want to retain the privacy they had previously
taken for granted. This is called "per-call"
blocking. Some phone systems allow "per-line"
blocking: the caller's number is kept private by
default and is released only when the caller enters
an "unblocking" code for a single call. A serious
-27-
difficulty is that for most caller ID systems,
automatic supply of phone numbers is routine.
Blocking, if available at all, is usually allowed only
on a per-call basis. With these systems the burden
for blocking is always on the caller. Callers must
know that their numbers are being released, must
learn how to block the release, and must remember
to enter the special code every time they want to
block automatic transmission of their names and
numbers. Hence callers cannot avoid "assuming
the risk" of privacy loss without careful self-
discipline.
Bell Atlantic, among other providers, have
been fighting all blocking on the grounds that it
will devalue their service.45 In 1992, New England
Telephone chose not to offer caller ID rather than
be forced to provide a blocking option. Under
pressure, New England Telephone reversed its
policy, but at first offered per-call blocking as the
only option. For other telephone companies as
well, per-line blocking is either unavailable or must
be specially requested by the customer. 46
In a preposterous example of the profit
motive at work, New York Telephone, in a full-
page letter in The New York Times, defended
caller ID with blocking on a single-call basis as a
public service valuable for consumers, society, and
the telephone companies.41 It insisted that caller
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ID can help deter crime such as bomb threats and
kidnapping, arguing that per-call blocking by code
adequately protects the privacy of callers as well
as those subscribing to the service. New York
Telephone maintained, furthermore, that per-line
blocking increases false alarms and compromises
the effectiveness of emergency response agencies
such as police, fire, and ambulance services by
impeding quick determination of call sources. It
claimed that children and others would either
forget or not know how to disengage the blocking
in an emergency.
This appeal to public policy is both self-
serving and deceptive. The phone companies are
well aware that the technology is available to
override blocking for "911" calls and other
emergency numbers. Moreover, with the
responsibility on the caller to safeguard privacy on
every call, privacy is lost by default. Experts say
that so far, few people are blocking release of their
numbers. That is no surprise. Even careful
readers can overlook or misunderstand inserts in
phone bills that describe blocking, and
consequently much of the public is unaware of the
option to block.
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VI. Suggestions and Possible Solutions
A) Consider first massive databases and
on-line dispersal of information. The move by
Lotus and Equifax to recall software allowing
access to files via personal computer is
encouraging. Apparently concerned with its
image, Equifax has also hired Professor Alan
Westin, a philosopher and privacy expert from
Columbia University, to review its privacy
protections. Thus it is clear that public pressure
can have an effect and must be continued.
In addition, we need better legislative
controls over access to information. The
European Union has proposed privacy guidelines
to restrict carefully the collection and
dissemination of personal data. These guidelines
require companies to register all databases
containing personal information, require that
subjects be told and give consent for their personal
data to be collected or used, and require that any
information gained for one purpose not be used for
any other purpose unless the individual consents
after being given an opportunity to refuse to allow
the information sharing. The guidelines also
prevent transfer of information from one country
to another unless the latter country also has
adequate protection of records, and they do not
allow collection of data on race, ethnic origin,
political or religious affiliation, health status or
sexual orientation.48 Europeans are astounded
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there is no comparable protection or similar plan
pending in the United States. Unfortunately
American corporations, far from embracing these
sound ideas, are fearful that the rules will hinder
their routine use of computer data. However,
many European countries are threatening to
prohibit business transactions with American
companies that cannot ensure similar protection.
Consequently, the profit motive may actually boost
privacy protection in this area.
We should note that this American fear of
regulating data may be unwarranted. Some argue
that Germany's experience with careful control of
electronic databases undermines U.S. marketers'
claims that strict privacy laws will place
unacceptable burdens on businesses. Today
Germany is cited as having Europe's most
successful direct marketing industry, despite laws
that forbid collecting personal information on
anyone without prior notification and withholding
that information if the individual wants to review
it. The German system requires businesses of
twenty or more employees to name an official to
oversee gathering of personal data. There are
state and federal data directors as well. 49
Sweden, which in 1973 was the first
country to pass a national privacy law, provides a
somewhat different example. It has a centralized
government file with the information that
marketers want, and the file is used by about 9
percent of Sweden's direct mail companies. so The
worry with this centralization is that it places too
much power in a single public agency. Advocates
of the system reply that the constitutional right for
any individual to see what is in the archives or files
places a check on the government. Having access
to information does not guarantee control over the
information, however, and it is not clear what
procedures Sweden has for those who find
erroneous information or want data eliminated
from their file.
Another proposal worth considering is the
formation of national privacy boards staffed with
experts who have considered the issues from
consumer, business, political, philosophical, and
economic viewpoints. These boards could oversee
regulations such as those suggested by the
European Union. They might also implement and
supervise additional protective measures, such as
provision of free annual credit reports to
consumers and regular mandatory updates, audits,
and corrections in reports.
Note, however, the common theme in
these different approaches by the European Union,
Germany, Sweden, and others. Each echoes a
dominant thesis of my book: the initial
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presumption must be that privacy protection is
important and guidelines are essential. Moreover,
each plan helps individuals retain control over
information about themselves by providing
knowledge about the data banks and access to the
information, and by requiring permission and
consent for collection or transfer of data.
B) For the second case, caller ID, it is
unfortunate that most parties to the debate have
taken extreme positions. They either recommend
that the service be legally prohibited, revoked, or
heavily regulated to protect privacy, or they
defend caller ID as a service that should be
available without limitations. It seems clear that
like computer databases, the service must be
regulated at the federal rather than local level,
perhaps with worldwide guidelines to follow. This
is necessary in part to coordinate the interstate
calling patterns of consumers and businesses, as
well as to harmonize the competing claims of
individual privacy and commercial viability. Local
or state regulations do not protect privacy
uniformly, and will undoubtedly lead consumers to
become frustrated or annoyed with a patchwork of
different rules and options. Such frustration will
only hinder the success of the technology. There
is, moreover, a better alternative for satisfying
both parties in the privacy debate over caller ID:
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namely to provide per-line blocking as the
standard service, with a choice to revert to per-call
blocking. This can be accomplished in a way that
allows people dynamically to negotiate the degree
of privacy they wish to sacrifice or maintain.5l
Consider how such a system would work
with caller ID. Initially, all phone subscribers' lines
would, by default, block the release of the caller's
number. Subscribers could choose to release their
number on a per-call basis by dialing an
unblocking code (other than *67). Thus far, this
is just per-line blocking. But phones with caller ID
displays could also be set up automatically to
refuse calls when the number has not been
provided by the caller. When an anonymous call
is attempted, the phone does not ring. The
thwarted caller hears a short recorded message
explaining that to complete the call, the originating
phone number must be furnished. This message
then instructs the caller what code to dial to give
out the number. Otherwise, the call is incomplete
and the caller is not charged. Thus, a caller has
the chance to decide whether a call is important
enough that it is worth surrendering anonymity.
This solution preserves choice and ensures
privacy. Callers can control when to give out their
numbers; call recipients can screen and refuse
anonymous calls. The system remains voluntary.
-34-
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Through a dynamic and interactive process, both
callers and call recipients are allowed to determine
the extent to which their privacy is compromised.
Most callers, of course, will want to
release their number when calling friends and
associates. And if such calls dominate their use of
the phone, they might choose to change the default
on their line so that it automatically releases their
number unless they dial in a blocking code. Thus,
a dynamic negotiation system may well lead many
people to change from per-line to per-call
blocking-- precisely what the phone companies
and the Federal Communications Commission
favor. But when these customers change their
default setting, they will know what they are
choosing and why; they will be actively consenting
to give out their numbers as a matter of course.
Some display units that can be purchased
for use with caller ID are already able to reject
anonymous calls, but they are a far cry from the
dynamic negotiation system described. With these
caller ID units, every call, whether accepted or
not, is considered to have been answered and is
charged to the caller. But a call that is rejected
because of its anonymity should entail no charge.
This requires that the call be intercepted by the
phone company's central office switchboard before
it reaches the recipient's line. The technology for
implementing dynamic negotiation for caller ID is
already available. The FCC need only amend its
recent ruling and mandate per-line blocking as the
default, requiring the necessary recordings and call
interceptions described.
Although inspired by the debate over caller
ID, the concept of dynamic negotiation of privacy
can apply to other telecommunications
technologies. One likely candidate is electronic
mail. With traditional paper mail, people have
always had the right, and the ability, to send
anonymous correspondence. Delivery of the
envelope requires neither that the letter be signed
nor that a return address be provided. On the
receiving end, people similarly have the right to
discard anonymous mail unopened. Applying the
principles of dynamic negotiation, senders of
electronic mail would have the option to identify
or not identify themselves. Recipients could reject
as undeliverable any e-mail with an unidentified
sender. The sender would then have the option to
retransmit the message, this time with a return
address. As with caller ID, the users negotiate
among themselves. The system itself remains
privacy neutral.
The fundamental presumption is that
privacy must be viewed as important from multiple
perspectives; its protection should be assumed to
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be necessary at the outset, and technology should
be so adapted that its use does not automatically
require that one forfeit one's privacy. Several
criteria guide the approach I have defended: (i) the
need to protect individual privacy for all parties to
a communication, (ii) the importance of letting
new technologies flourish, and (iii) the need for
national guidelines to provide consistency in
system use and privacy protection where we now
have a conglomeration of conflicting state
guidelines. Since technological innovation
proceeds rapidly, we must continually examine
how best to make possible new features while
preserving or enhancing our existing privacy.
The challenge is to protect privacy
comprehensively, but not at the expense of
technological services. For Caller ID as well as
the European proposals for data bases, the key
idea is to begin with maximal privacy protection,
and then ensure that people are educated,
consulted, and allowed to give consent or refusal
before information is gathered or disseminated.
They may then choose whether or not it is
worthwhile for them to release personal database
information or their phone numbers, etc.
Consumers must demand that the government
make it possible easily to protect the privacy of
both the caller and the called, the e-mail sender
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and receiver. Individuals, not the telephone or
communications companies, should determine the
manner and extent to which the inevitability of
new information technologies pervade our nation.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, I have focused on only two
instances where information technology and
privacy collide. Many other cases arise where
there is a need to balance access to information
and privacy. For example: Should doctors know
when patients have AIDS or are HIV positive?
Should patients be told the HIV status of doctors?
Who, for what reasons, should be allowed access
to the results of genetic testing? How much
employment monitoring, through closed-circuit
television, phone tapping, e-mail and computer
files, is acceptable? Are tracking and surveillance
systems for criminal suspects justified? Surely
there are many others.
There are a number of moral issues that
arise from conflicts between privacy and
information technology. First, technological
advances without restrictions often erase one's
ability to maintain privacy and control information
about oneself. Second, competing claims between
public access and individual privacy are sometimes
compounded by concerns over the coercive power
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of the state. We want to live in an open and
accountable society, yet we also want to preserve
our right to be let alone. Third, one person's or
one group's right to know often collides with
another's right to keep information private. It is
difficult to make broad generalizations about how
to balance these interests. Individuals may make
different choices based on their evaluation of the
context of each case, and it is essential to involve
them in the decisions wherever possible.
Legal issues are rapidly increasing in this
area as well. In some cases, there are as yet no
legal guidelines to help answer questions about
how much is private, as with doctors who are HIV
positive and want to withhold that information. In
other cases, there is a patchwork of local
regulations that conflict, as in different u.s. state
laws concerning the telephone companies and
caller ID. Finally, there are cases where national
regulations and legislation have been proposed and
passed, but where there are loopholes or escape
clauses that vitiate the intended effects of the
legislation, as is the case with U. S. statutes on
databases and information storage.
There are many good reasons to keep
public records open and accessible. It is important
for society to monitor illegal activities, to capture
criminals, and to preserve public safety. Oliver
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North's e-mail messages helped lead to major
revelations in the Iran-Contra scandal, and
organized crime leaders have been detected
through phone taps and surveillance. Yet personal
data can be collected and used to blackmail
people, as was done by J. Edgar Hoover and the
FBI in the 19608 and 1970s, ruining innocent
lives.52
Clearly individual privacy must be balanced
against other rights and values such as public
safety. It is sometimes difficult to separate trivial
irritations arising from privacy intrusions, such as
extra junk mail, from more damaging privacy
invasions. But it is also worth remembering that
technology and privacy need not be incompatible
and antagonistic. Airport X-ray machines can
make hand searches of luggage less frequent.
Magnetic markers in books and on merchandise
make searches of briefcases and bags in libraries
and stores largely unnecessary. Our goal should
be to manage new technologies appropriately, not
impede or destroy them.
My approach requires first that we specify
which types of matters are private. Surely aspects
of one's medical history may legitimately be viewed
as private, in contrast to one's publicly listed
telephone number. Second, we must maintain a
presumption in favor of privacy and then develop
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criteria for deciding whether a violation of privacy
is justified. Random drug testing for airline pilots
may be a clear invasion of privacy, but it may be
justified on the basis of public safety if there is
strong evidence of drug abuse related to accidents
and reasonable likelihood the testing can alleviate
the problem. In contrast, random testing of clerical
workers is not legitimate when their work can be
monitored in other ways without violating their
privacy. In the case of address lists and phone
numbers, local firehouses or ambulance services
may need this information to respond immediately
to emergencies and save lives. And financial
institutions clearly have legitimate uses for credit
histories in an era of economic stress and increased
bankruptcies. But free-flowing information on
interconnected public or private databases that can
be sold without restrictions is not only highly
questionable, but extremely intrusive.53
-41-
l.Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973),64 - 67.
2.Aristotle, The Politics, translated by Benjamin
Jowett, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed.
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House,
1941), 1127-1324.
-42-
3.JoOOLocke, The Second Treatise on
Government, ed. Thomas P. Peardon, (New
York: Macmillan, Library of Liberal Arts, 1988),
4.
4.Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private
Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 9.
5.Alan Westin, "The Origins of Modern Claims
to Privacy" in Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed.,
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An
Anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984),56-74.
6.Ibid., p. 57. See also Peter H. Klopfer and
Daniel I. Rubenstein, "The Concept Privacy and
Its Biological Basis," Journal of Social Issues:
Privacy as a Behavioral Phenomenon, 33, 3
(1977), 52-65.
7.See Journal of Social Issues: Privacy as a
Behavioral Phenomenon, 33, 3 (1977) for a wide
range of essays establishing privacy as a
universal. See also Margaret Mead, Coming of
Age in Samoa (New York: New American
Library, 1949).
-43-
8.Westin, "Origins of Modern Claims to
Privacy," 59ff.
9.Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The
Right to Privacy," 4 Harvard Law Review 193
(1890), reprinted in Schoeman, ed.,
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, 75-103.
10.Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577 (1745).
11.Thomas C. Cooley, Law of Torts, (1st ed.
1880, 2nd. ed. 1888).




15.Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Company, 171 N.Y. 538 (1902). The defendant
had admittedly used lithographs of plaintiffs
portrait without her consent to advertise its
flour. But the New York Court of Appeals
refused to recognize legal protection of privacy
as part of common law in New York.
16.1n Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Company, 122 Ga. 190 (1905), the Georgia
Supreme Court declared the right of privacy to
be part of Georgia law.
17.William L. Prosser, "Privacy," 48 California
Law Review 383 (1960), 389. Prosser's
suggested additional tort privacy protection
against publicity placing one in a false light is
rarely invoked because of its overlap with
defamation.
18.Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The Court stated that the physicians
were being prosecuted as accessories to the
crime of contraception use and therefore had the
legal standing to challenge, on behalf of married
couples, the features of the law that made such
use a crime.
19.Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972).
20.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21.Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977).
22.Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
-44-
23.StanJey v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
24.Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25.Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
26.Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
27.Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 600
(1977).
28.Judith Wagner DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy:
Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997). Richard
Posner, "Uncertain Protection of Privacy By the
Supreme Court," 1979 Supreme Court Review,
173, 214 (1979).
-45-
29.This case is described in an op-ed piece:
Judith Wagner DeCew, "Your Privacy Is Being
Threatened," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 23,
1991; reprinted in The Atlanta Constitution,
March 41991; the San Francisco Examiner,
March 12 1991; and the Chicago Tribune,
March 15, 1991.
30.Jeffrey Rothfeder, "Is Nothing Private?,"
Business Week, September 4, 1989,81.
31.Ibid., 74.
32.Ibid., 74.
33.Michele Galen, "The Right to Privacy:
There's More Loophole Than Law, Business
Week, September 4, 1989, 77.
34.Daniel Akst, "We Know Where You Live ... ,"
Boston Globe, October 16, 1995, 11.
35.Michael W. Miller, "Equifax to Stop Selling
Its Data to Junk Mailers," Wall Street Journal,
August 9, 1991, B1-B2.
36.Charles Piller, "Privacy in Peril," MacWorld,
July 1993, 126.
37.Saul Hansell, "Keeping Identity Thieves at
Bay," New York Times, June 16, 1996, sect. 4,
5.
38.Part of the following argument appeared in an
op-ed piece: Judith Wagner DeCew, "Caller ID a
Subtle Threat to Privacy," Middlesex News
(MA), February 17, 1994, widely reprinted in
newspapers under various titles.
39.Richard Lacayo, "Now We've Really Got
Your Number," Time, November 11, 1991,40.
-46-
40.Glenn Chatmas Smith, "We've Got Your
Number! (Is it Constitutional to Give it Out?):
Caller Identification Technology and the Right
to Informational Privacy," 37 V.c.L.A. Law
Review 145 (1989); Arthur Miller, statement
before the Subcommittee on Technology and the
Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
(August 1, 1990), reprinted in M. Ethan Katsh,
ed., Taking Sides: Clashing Views on
Controversial Legal Issues, 5th ed. (Guilford,
Conn.: Dushkin, 1993),342-344. Miller
supports caller ID, arguing that the caller's claim
to privacy is weak or nonexistent, whereas he
favors allowing caller ID to protect the privacy
of called parties who have "the superior privacy
right" (343).
-47-
41.Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735, 747, 748
(1979). In this case the Court held that law
enforcement officials do not need a search
warrant to install a pen register, a device that
records numbers dialed from a telephone. The
majority wrote, "All telephone users realize that
they must 'convey' phone numbers to the
telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are
completed. All subscribers realize, moreover,
that the phone company has facilities for making
permanent records of the numbers they dial."
(442 U.S. at 742, cited in Miller, statement,
343). The Smith court may not have anticipated
and envisioned the further privacy problems of
advanced telephone technology as described
below.
42.Richard Carelli, "Court Clears Baby Bells for
Information Fields," Boston Globe, October 31,
1991, 53+. To the dismay of consumers and
news and broadcasting groups, the Supreme
Court, without comment, rejected a request to
bar the Baby Bell companies from using
telephone lines in this way.
43.Barry Steinhardt is quoted in Charles Edward
Anderson, "Night Callers Beware," ABA Journal
75 (May 1989), 30.
44.Mary Lu Carnevale, "Caller ID Rings With
New Controversies," Wall Street Journal, March
25, 1991, B1-B2.
45.Ibid.
46.Ronald Rosenberg, "New Service for Phones
Will Tell Who's Calling," Boston Globe, October
14, 1992, 1+.
47.Letter signed by Bailey Geeslin, New York
Times, June 20, 1991, D23.
48.John Markoff, "Europe's Plans to Protect
Privacy Worry Business," New York Times,
April 11, 1991, A1+; Larry Tye, "EC May Force
New Look at Privacy," Boston Globe,
September 7, 1993, 10. An excellent summary
-48-
of the European approach is supplied in Paul M.
Schwartz, "European Data Protection Law and
Restrictions on International Data Flows," 80
Iowa Law Review 471 (1995). On the domestic
approaches in Germany and Sweden, see Colin
Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection
and Public Policy in Europe and the United
States (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1992).
See also, Charles Franklin, ed., Business Guide
to Privacy and Data Protection Legislation
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1996),
where the text of the Council of Europe OECD
and national laws in Europe are summarized and
explained, with relevant portions translated.
-49-
49.Larry Tye, "No Private Lives: German
System Puts a Lid on Data," Boston Globe,
September 7, 1993, 1+.
50.Ibid., 10.
51.The solution proposed first appeared in Ross
E. Mitchell and Judith Wagner DeCew,
"Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars,"
Technology Review 97, 8 (1994), 70-71.
52.Piller, "Privacy in Peril," 126.
53.An early version of this paper was presented
on November 11, 1993 at a conference on
"Philosophy and Information Technology" at
Erasmus University in Rotterdam, The
Netherlands, organized by Jeroen van den
Hoven, and was written with the support of
research fellowships from the Higgins School of
Humanities at Clark University and the National
Endowment for the Humanities. This version is
drawn from my book, In Pursuit of Privacy:
Law, Ethics, and the Rise ofTechnolgy (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997).
-50-
Biography
Judith Wagner DeCew is Associate Professor of
Philosophy at Clark University, where she
teaches philosophy of law, ethics, and social and
political theory. She has been on the faculty at
MIT and has been a Research Fellow at Harvard
Law School and at the Bunting Institute of
Radcliffe College. Professor DeCew has
received research fellowships from the National
Endowment for Humanities, the American
Council of Learned Societies, and the American
Association of University Women. In 1993 she
was awarded Clark's Hayden Faculty Fellowship
for excellence in teaching and research. She is
coeditor of Theory and Practice (New York
University Press, 1995) and her newest book is
In Pursuit of Privacy: Law. Ethics. and the Rise
of Technology (Cornell University Press, Spring
1997). She has published numerous articles in
such journals as Ethics, Law and Philosophy,
Philosophical Studies, Social Theory and
Practice, The Hastings Center Report, Journal of
Value Inquiry, Journal of Philosophical Logic,























o. 1, November, 1988




Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as Much




Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care:
Is Society Sending a Mixed Message?
John V. Hartline, M.D.
Neonatology, Kalamazoo, Michigan
No.4, March, 1989
Codes of Ethics in Business
Michael Davis
Illinois Institute of Technology
-53-
No.5, May, 1989






Surrogate Parenting: The Michigan Legislation
Lucille Taylor, Majority Counsel
Michigan State Senate
Paul Denenfeld, Legal Director










Women's Dilemma: Is it Reasonable to be
Rational?
Harriet Baber
















Owning and Controlling Technical Information
Vivian Weil
Illinois Institute of Technology
-55-
No.2, March, 1992






Lying: A Failure of Autonomy and Self-Respect
Jane Zembaty
The University of Dayton
No.4, June, 1992
National Health Insurance Proposals: An Ethical
Perspective
Alan O. Kogan, M.D.
Kalamazoo, Michigan
VOLUME VI
No.1 & 2, November, 1992
Arguing for Economic Equality
John Baker
University College, Dublin, Ireland




No.5 & 6, June, 1993
Helping to Harm? The Ethical Dilemmas of




o. 1, September, 1993
Why Does Utilitarianism Seem Plausible?
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
o. 2, November, 1993




o. 3, February, 1994
Narrative, Luck and Ethics: The Role of Chance
in Ethical Encounters, in Literature and Real Life
Experiences
Nona Lyons
University of Southern Maine
-57-
No.4, February, 1994





Michigan's Deadlocked Commission on Death




Two Papers on Environmentalism




Two Papers on Environmentalism




Race Family and Obligation








Association for Practical and Professional Ethics
Indiana University
No.2, May, 1996






















Privacy and Information Technology
Judith Wagner DeCew
Clark University


